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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DAVID LEE MCCLAIN : Case No. 950173-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (1994) which permits a defendant in a circuit court criminal 
action to appeal to the Court of Appeals for reversal of a final 
judgment and conviction for any crime other that first degree or 
capital felony. 
ARGUMENT 
I, Mr, McClain's conduct was reasonable, and he is entitled to ask 
for relief from having his rights to a fair trial and due process 
violated. 
The city argues that Mr. McClain can not claim that his 
rights were violated when his own conduct was unreasonable. City's 
Brief at 14,17, 19-21,25-26 (hereinafter "CB"). The city fails to 
cite to any relevant case law, statute or rule to support this 
contention. This argument should be disregarded. State In 
Interest of M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991). 
The city contends that Mr. McClain failed to "timely" 
present a witness. CB at 13. However the city does not provide 
any definition or authority of what should be considered timely. 
This argument should be disregarded. Id. That Mr. McClain 
presented the witness on the afternoon of the trial should be 
considered timely. 
The city points out in State v. Maestas 815 P.2d 1319, 
1324 (Utah App. 1991), that the defendant could not claim that his 
right to due process was violated when he failed to provided notice 
of his alibi witnesses. CB. at 12-13. The city claims that 
because Mr. McClain also failed to provide notice that his witness 
would appear in the afternoon he can not claim his right to due 
process was violated. However, providing notice of alibi witnesses 
is required by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1980) . The city 
fails to cite any authority that requires the defendant to notify 
the city of what time his witness will appear at trial. 
The city assumes that counsel for Mr. McClain was aware 
that having his witness testify at 4:00 p.m., created a problem 
that justified a pre-trial motion or notice of some kind. CB at 
13-14. The witness coming in to testify at 4:00 p.m. did not 
become a problem until that afternoon. The actual need for a 
recess did not become clear until Mr. McClain finished testifying 
at 3:10 p.m. R. 171. Until this point no one knew how long the 
trial might last. It was possible that the Mr. McClain would not 
have finished with all his other evidence until after 4:00 p.m. 
The trial judge had indicated that as long as the defendant did not 
finish before 3:00 p.m., she would grant a short recess in order 
for the witness to testify. R. 134. So it was not until 3:10 
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p.m., when the trial judge denied the requested recess, that Mr. 
McClain was confronted with an actual problem. Considering that 
Mr. McClain had given the court notice earlier that day that there 
might be a problem, combined with the fact that no one knew for 
sure until that afternoon that there was going to be a problem, 
the defendant's actions were perfectly reasonable. 
Further, the defendant deserves some leeway on what time 
he presents his witnesses, since the defendant presents his case 
second. Because the city presents its evidence first, the city has 
a better idea of when it will need its witnesses. The defendant 
presents his evidence second. And he can not be sure how long the 
city will take to present its case. Because the defendant goes 
after the city, the defendant does not know exactly when his 
witnesses will be presented. 
Also, because the city goes first its witnesses do not 
have to wait around as long to testify. Since the defendant goes 
second if the defendant makes his witnesses come at the start of 
the trial they end up waiting around longer to testify. The city 
getting to go first makes it more convenient for its witnesses to 
testify. And this is especially important when the witness is a 
busy professional like a doctor. 
Because the defendant presents his witnesses second the 
defendant should be given some reasonable leeway on what time he 
presents his witnesses. And having a witness come in to testify 
only fifty minutes after he would have been expected to testify is 
not unreasonable. 
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The city argues that there was no guarantee, other than 
a verbal guarantee, that the witness would appear. CB. at 24. 
This problem could be said for every motion for a continuance so a 
witness can appear, ever asked for. Even a subpoena does not 
guarantee the presence of a witness. And a subpoena does not 
guarantee what time a witness will appear. Since this is a problem 
with every motion to continue in order to secure a witness, this 
potential problem should be disregarded. 
The city also argues that if the recess requested was 
granted and the witness appeared the trial may have had to 
continued to another day. CB. at 24. This argument is speculative 
and should be disregarded. And this is a potential problem that 
could arise at all trials. And it is unlikely that the fifty 
minutes requested would cause the trial to be moved to another day. 
Dr. Edward's testimony might cause the trial to go longer, but as 
argued in Mr. McClain's main brief this should not be held against 
the defendant. Defendant's Brief at 9 n. 1. 
Finally the city argues that the witness, Dr. Edwards' 
testimony would have added very little. CB. at 23. The city 
seems to believe that Mr. McClain was arguing that it was his 
medication that caused him to behave and drive the way he did. The 
city fails to cite to where in the record Mr. McClain or his 
counsel made this claim, therefore this claim should be 
disregarded. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (7), (e) . 
Mr. McClain's defense was based on the disease of 
diabetes and not the medication he was taking for it. R. 176-77. 
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The fact that the city is confused about Mr. McClain's defense adds 
further support that Dr. Edwards testimony regarding Mr. McClain's 
diabetes would have been helpful. 
II, There was a rational basis, upon which the jury could have 
found the defendant guilty of reckless driving. 
The jury could have found that Mr. McClain's action of 
driving while he was suffering from disorientation, caused by a 
diabetic reaction was reckless driving. In deciding the question 
of whether a lesser included offense instruction should be 
included, the requesting party has to demonstrate that there was a 
rational basis for the trier of fact to base a finding of guilty on 
that lesser included offense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 
(Utah 1983) . In deciding this question, there only needs to be a 
sufficient quantum of evidence to establish the elements of the 
lesser included offense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 
1983). And all inferences must be drawn in a light must favorable 
to the defendant. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986) . 
The city argues that there was no evidence provided at 
trial to prove the required element of intent. CB at 27-31. 
Reckless Driving requires that the defendant willfully and wantonly 
disregarded the safety of persons or property. Salt Lake City Code 
§ 12.52.350. The city argues that there was not evidence presented 
at trial that can prove that the defendant willfully and wantonly 
disregarded the safety of persons or property. The city also 
implies that Mr. McClain's diabetic condition would prevent him 
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from forming the required intent. CB. at 29, 30. However the 
defendant never argued that the condition affected his ability to 
form intent. And the state fails to cite to any authority to 
support the contention that Mr. McClain's condition would have 
prevented him from forming the required intent. 
Evidence of intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof. 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Therefore intent 
can be inferred from the defendant's actions and from the 
surrounding circumstances. State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 
1990) . The jury could easily infer from the evidence that Mr. 
McClain continued to drive in spite of his condition, and because 
of this, Mr. McClain was driving in willful and wanton disregard 
for the safety of others. Especially in light of the evidence that 
Mr. McClain was driving at all in light of his prior knowledge that 
he was susceptible to becoming disoriented and prone to blacking 
out. R. 158. 
With all inferences being drawn in favor of the defendant 
there is sufficient evidence presented to prove that Mr. McClain 




Based on the foregoing, the Appellant Mr. McClain 
requests that the guilty verdicts be overturned and a new trial 
granted. Further it is requested that at this new trial Mr. 
McClain would be entitled to his lesser included instruction. 
SUBMITTED this U day of December, 1995. 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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